Cyber Threat Intelligence
A Threat Actor Targeting South Korean Education: @KimJEN
✅ Quick Overview of Cyberattacks on South Korean Educational Institutions: @KimJEN
Published: November 17, 2026
✅ Executive Summary
- (Deep & Dark Web) After joining RaidForums on October 27, 2026, KimJEN began posting claims of hacking against South Korean educational institutions on November 12, directing users to a Telegram channel. The Telegram channel was created on October 26, one day before the forum registration, and began actively releasing data claimed to be stolen from November 12 onwards.
- While activity on the DDW forum occurs at various times, activity on Telegram is concentrated between 10 PM and 1 AM (KST), suggesting the possibility of an actor based in Asia, though it is difficult to determine nationality or residence based solely on this pattern.
- (Key Activities) From November 12 to 17, 2026, the actor claimed to have hacked and leaked data from South Korean universities and public institutions, exposing internal data from academic, administrative, and accounting systems, and conducting Defacement attacks on subdomains.
- Claiming to hold access rights to approximately 100 universities and promising to release additional data daily suggests the possibility of ongoing attacks and leaks.
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(Attack Patterns) Evidence was identified of the actor exploiting vulnerabilities such as unauthenticated API access, SQL query execution functions, arbitrary file read vulnerabilities, and Web Shells to conduct system infiltration, credential theft, internal database dumps, and web page defacement.
- Traces of ARTEX usage and automated reconnaissance, data collection, and result verification were confirmed in the leaked files, suggesting a high likelihood of utilizing AI-based attack automation tools.
📌 1. Who is @KimJEN?
📌 1.1. Raidforums
- On October 27, 2026, after joining RaidForums, user KimJEN began posting claims of hacking damages primarily targeting South Korean educational institutions.
- They publish all claimed stolen data via their Telegram channel, using forum posts to direct users to this channel.
- The Telegram channel was opened on October 26, 2026, one day prior to the RaidForums registration date, announcing upcoming South Korean-related data leaks, with data exfiltration activities officially starting on November 12.
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The RaidForums profile of user KimJEN is as follows.
- (Forum Activity History) Although KimJEN joined RaidForums on October 27, 2026, they began their primary activities on November 12. As of November 17, 2026, they have posted 10 threads targeting South Korea, with no evidence of other interactions such as leaving comments on other users' posts.
- (Referred Members) One member joined through KimJEN’s referral: @Mar******, a new account registered on November 16, 2026. No activity history such as posting threads or leaving comments has been confirmed so far.
- Based on activity from 2026-11-12 to 2026-11-17, KimJEN shows prominent nighttime activity on Telegram, posting over 50% of all messages between 10 PM and 1 AM Korea Standard Time (KST), whereas on the DDW forum, posts are made across a relatively diverse range of times.
- The concentration of activity during nighttime hours in Korea Standard Time suggests the possibility of an Asian resident experiencing evening and nighttime in similar time zones, but due to the short 6-day analysis period and the fact that activity hours do not constitute proof of nationality or actual residence, it is difficult to definitively conclude origin from a specific country.
📌 1.2. Telegram
- KimJEN utilizes the dark web forum RaidForums as a means to promote Telegram channels and attract users, while the actual disclosure and distribution of data claimed to be stolen is primarily conducted via Telegram.
- Information regarding the Telegram personal account, channel, group chat rooms, and contact bot associated with KimJEN is as follows.
- KimJEN is publicly releasing data claimed to be stolen without any separate sales conditions, suggesting that financial motives are low. While no political motives have been confirmed, he claims to be active for simple entertainment purposes.
- A photo of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un is used as the channel's profile image, and the username KimJEN may also be a variation of "Kim Jong Un."
- Numerous accounts believed to be Korean participate in the Telegram chat room and show interest in KimJEN’s activities. While various speculations and debates regarding his country of origin and nationality have taken place, no objective evidence supporting these claims has been confirmed.
- KimJEN claims to hold European citizenship and states that he can speak Korean. However, given that the sentence structure and expression in some of his messages written in Korean appear somewhat unnatural, it is possible that he utilized a translation tool.
- (2026-11-14) KimJEN announced that he would reveal the tools used in the hack upon reaching 100 channel subscribers. Although the subscriber count surpassed 100 on November 16, whether the tools were actually released and the reliability of this statement remain uncertain.
- When questioned about his use of ARTEX, KimJEN denied its usage, citing that the tool is monitored by law enforcement agencies. Instead, he mentioned that he prefers the CyberStrike hacking agent.
- Analysis of the leaked files revealed indications that, contrary to KimJEN’s claims, ARTEX was actually used in attacks. Further details can be found in 3. Attack Methods Identified in Leaked Files.
📌 2. Timeline of Leaked Files and Key Characteristics
- The following list is based on leaked files published on the Telegram channel, and the key data contained in each file and the attack methods identified through file analysis are as follows.
📌 3. Attack Methods Identified in Leaked Files
- In addition to the leaked data from victim institutions, files from which intrusion paths and attack flows could be inferred were identified in the files leaked by KimJEN on Telegram and RaidForums.
- In some leaked files, traces suggesting the use of AI agent-based automated intrusion tools were identified.
- An intrusion result report apparently created by the agent was discovered, and traces were found indicating instructions to disguise the intrusion as an authorized CTF.
- The keyword ARTEX was identified in a portion of the data collection script estimated to be the attacker's local path.
- Records indicating task termination due to the exhaustion of the execution budget, along with notes appearing to summarize judgments made during the intrusion process, were identified.
- Threat actors targeted systems of public institutions and educational organizations, including universities, education offices, and local governments; these targeted systems share the common characteristic of holding a large volume of sensitive personal information.
- It was confirmed that the primary intrusion vectors were systems with insufficient authentication and input validation and administrative and development pages exposed externally.
📌 3.1. Attack Methods on South Korean Universities
- Analysis of the leaked files revealed indications that KimJEN targeted key operational systems of South Korean educational institutions, including the research administration integration system Webcash rERP, the university accounting information system UNIVais, the university ERP solution Tomato System eXCampus, and the LMS used by respective universities.
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The attack methods related to rERP, UNIVais, and the University A groupware are analyzed in detail separately below, and the following attack methods are estimated to have been utilized at other institutions.
- Dumped data after gaining server access via a web shell and stealing database credentials
- Collected data by exploiting SQL injection vulnerabilities in production servers
- Retrieved and collected bulk data via APIs accessible without authentication
- Obtained source code from Git repositories and stole database credentials hardcoded in the code
📌 3.1.1. Attack Methods on Webcash rERP at Approximately 20 Universities
- Exploited an Arbitrary File Read vulnerability to steal remote deployment authentication keys and web server configuration files stored on the server.
- Used the stolen authentication key to authenticate to the server, then installed a Web Shell to obtain remote command execution privileges.
- Through the Web Shell, reconnoitered server accounts and permissions, operating system (OS) information, configuration files, and authentication keys, saving the collection results to a separate file.
- Performed Defacement attacks targeting subdomains of South Korean universities, modifying the existing pages to display a message stating ‘Hacked by KRRK’.
- Evidence of executing files suspected to be remote control malware was identified, with different executable files used depending on the operating system.
- Windows: Moved the P-a424e320.exe file to the web folder, then copied and executed it in the C:\Windows\Temp path.
- Linux: Executed the pa_v2.elf file in the /tmp/ path.
- Windows: Moved the P-a424e320.exe file to the web folder, then copied and executed it in the C:\Windows\Temp path.
- Utilized the system's user inquiry functionality to collect user account lists, departmental organizational structures, and permission group information.
📌 3.1.2. Attack Method Against the UNIVais System at 4 Universities
- Evidence of accessing internal data via a server communication interface that could be called without authentication was identified.
- Queried and stole key data items such as login accounts, user information, attachment file information, bank account information, and login history.
📌 3.1.3. Attack Method Against University A's Portal DB, ERP, and Groupware
- Evidence of accessing a test SQL execution page left on the operations server, which included SQL query input and execution capabilities, and querying the database was identified.
- There is a possibility that this functionality was used to dump the entire academic and portal databases.
- The attacker logged into the groupware system with the admin account to collect information such as the administrator dashboard, user list, organizational chart, and electronic approval details; however, the specific method used to obtain credentials for the administrator account remains unidentified.
📌 3.2. Analysis of ARTEX Usage and AI-based Attack Automation
- Traces of Chinese language usage were repeatedly identified across various attack-related artifacts included in the leaked data, such as intrusion manifests, defacement HTML, collection scripts, and proxy node labels.
- This suggests the possibility that KimJEN uses Chinese or operates in a Chinese-language environment, but since it is also possible that these artifacts were generated by ARTEX, a Chinese open-source LLM-based tool, it is difficult to definitively identify the attacker's nationality or actual language of use based solely on these indicators.
- In the leaked file (ac.kr.zip), the working path (/home/hd/tools/artex/ARTEX/data/tasks/17/) and task IDs (i2777, i2843) of ARTEX, a Chinese open-source LLM-based penetration testing framework, were identified, confirming evidence of utilizing an ARTEX-based working environment.
- Given that the ARTEX working path begins with /home/hd/, there is a possibility that ARTEX was operated in a Linux environment using the account name 'hd'.
- The phrase "Prtseek 只用于学习和授权场景 (Prtseek is only for learning and authorized scenarios)" was found in the comment at the bottom of the HTML file for defacement.
- Prtseek is an ARTEX-based penetration testing tool in whose development 黄豆 (Hwangdu), a user active in Chinese hacking communities, participated. This phrase suggests that the attack-related artifacts were presented as results of authorized security testing, while also indicating the possibility that Prtseek was used for defacement operations.
- The analysis report on the compromise of a South Korean public portal, included in the leaked data (police_go_kr.zip), contains the phrase 'Engagement: authorised CTF' along with status indicators (✅/⚠️/❌) commonly used in LLM-generated reports, suggesting the possibility that an automated AI agent generated the report.
📌 3.3. Defacement (Web Page Defacement)
- KimJEN has performed Defacement attacks targeting multiple South Korean institutional web pages.
- The attacker name (Defacer) on the defaced web pages used the Telegram bot name 'krrk', and a Telegram channel for data leaks was also specified to promote the channel and attract users.
- Analysis of Defacement-related logs and manifests included in the leaked file (ac.kr.zip) revealed that the existing index.html was backed up in the format index.html.bak_YYYYMMDD, and then overwritten with a modified index.html using rERP's remote deployment function or a Web Shell.
- Subsequently, HTTP response status codes and MD5 hashes were checked via GET requests to verify whether the web page had been defaced.
- The manifest was also written in Chinese, indicating that traces of Chinese language use were confirmed in the work records of the Defacement attack execution process as well.
✅ Threat Detection Recommendations and Mitigation:
- (Security Threats to South Korean Educational Institutions and Key Business Systems) It was confirmed that key business systems used by South Korean educational institutions were targeted in KimJEN's attack cases, including the research administration integration system Webcash rERP, the university accounting information system UNIVais, the university ERP solution eXCampus by Tomatoesystem, and the LMS of each university.
- Since these systems are linked to core operations such as academic administration, administrative affairs, and accounting, a breach could lead to the large-scale leakage of personal information and internal business information. Moreover, if vulnerable features or configurations of solutions commonly used by multiple educational institutions are exploited, there is a possibility that the same attack method could spread to numerous institutions.
- Accordingly, educational institutions should collaborate with solution vendors to prioritize checking the status of security patch application for externally exposed administrators, distribution, and test pages, as well as APIs accessible without authentication, and disable or restrict access to unnecessary functions.
- Lowered Barriers to Entry Due to AI-Based Attack Automation Evidence of ARTEX usage and automated system reconnaissance, data collection, and attack result verification was confirmed in the leaked files, suggesting that AI-based penetration testing tools may have been utilized in the actual attack process.
- These tools can automate the entire attack sequence from vulnerability discovery and intrusion to data collection and result compilation, indicating that an environment is being created where attackers with relatively low technical skills can attempt large-scale data theft targeting multiple institutions.
- Therefore, attention must be paid to the possibility that not only known vulnerabilities but also basic security management deficiencies, such as functions accessible without authentication, exposed configuration files, and reusable credentials, may be exploited as key entry points for automated attacks.
- Credential Theft and Response to Further Intrusions During KimJEN's attack, evidence of the theft of server configuration files, deployment authentication keys, and database connection information, as well as Web Shell installation, was confirmed, suggesting that the attacker may have maintained access privileges or expanded their penetration into internal systems after the initial breach.
- Relevant institutions must replace major credentials such as deployment authentication keys and DB accounts, and inspect for the presence of Web Shells and suspicious executables, while also analyzing administrator login, server-to-server remote access, and large-scale data query histories to verify if further intrusions have occurred.
- In particular, it is necessary to share the exploited functionalities and attack vectors between educational institutions using the same solution and their vendors to prevent the spread of similar damages.
- (Potential for Further Damage and Need for Continuous Monitoring) KimJEN claims that the security level in South Korea is weak and has threatened to hold system access privileges for approximately 100 universities and release related data from one institution daily.
- Although the veracity of these claims and the actual scale of access privileges held remain unconfirmed, given the history of intrusion and data disclosure activities targeting numerous educational institutions, it is difficult to rule out the possibility of additional data leaks and web page defacements.
- Accordingly, relevant institutions must monitor new leaked posts on Telegram and Deep & Dark Web forums, and cross-reference published information with internal system logs to swiftly confirm actual intrusions and the scope of data exposure.
🧑💻 Report Author: S2W TALON
👉 Contact Us: https://s2w.inc/en/contact